Current English land law on the co-ownership of interests of land has developed quite a contentious history pertaining to the relationship between the acquisition of rights and the quantification of the shares. In terms of co-ownership, there are huge variances and legal consequences when legal ownership is in one person’s name compared to two. These differences can be seen in various landmark cases which have created precedent and developed refined principles such as Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset and the Stack v Dowden. For the courts, it has often been relatively complex to distinguish between constructive and resulting trusts and to decide on the procedure to be used for the quantification of equitable entitlement once the decision to impute has been established. The quantification of resulting trusts is carefully considered in both, Midland Bank v Cooke and Stack v Snowden. In many co-ownership cases dealing with the acquisition of rights and the quantification of shares, the outcomes aren’t always proportionate. Reasons can include the ambiguities in the identification and changes of common intention and contributions types. In speaking to this issue, Baroness Hale stated in Stack v Dowden that “each case will turn on its own facts” and furthermore elaborated on the conditions for a common intention construct arising. It is furthermore important to critically discuss the repercussions these cases have for the future of co-ownership law to reconcile existing sources of confusion. In order to address the existing complexities in respect to the acquiescence of co-ownership beneficial interests in land, it is important to identify their differences. A co-ownership beneficial in an interest of land can be established thro... ... middle of paper ... ...owden' [2007] CONVPL 83, 86 M. Pawlowski, 'Imputed intention and joint ownership - a return to common sense: Jones v Kernott (Case Comment)' [2012] CPL 149, 158 P. O'Hagan, 'Quantifying Interests Under Resulting Trusts' [1997] MLR 420, 427 S. Gardner, 'Quantum in Gissing v Gissing constructive trusts' [2004] LQR 541, 548 S. Panesar, 'Quantifying beneficial interest in joint ownership disputes: is the constructive trust changing?' [2012] CONVPL. L.J 59, 67 W. Swadling, 'Explaining resulting trusts' [2008] LQR 72, 102 Cases Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 Legislation Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 s 15(1)(a) Law Commission Papers Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial Consquences of Relationship Breakdown (Law Com No 307, 2007) Law Commission, Sharing Homes (Law Com, 2002)
Assessment of the Statement that Property is a Power Relationship Between People Property is the right to possess, enjoy or use a determinant thing, and includes the right of excluding others from doing the same. The concept of ownership or property has no single or widely accepted definition. Like any other concept it has great weight in public discourse and the popular usage varies broadly. Property is frequently conceived as a 'bundle of rights and obligations.' Property is stressed as not a relationship between people and things, but a relationship between people with regard to things.
in which property is owned by the state or group, to be shared in common
There is uncertainty surrounding the law in regards to the ownership of property and proprietary estoppel. This paper will deal with these issues by analysing two cases that involve these questions. It will first address Jack’s case and whether the two objects in question are chattels or fixtures; then, it will examine a Laurence’s case and whether he can rely on proprietary estoppel or not. By dealing with the two cases, this paper will clarify questions of what constitutes a chattel or fixture, and in what situations proprietary estoppel may apply.
Powell, Jefferson H. “The Original Understanding of Original Intent.” Harvard Law Review Vol. 98, No. 5 (Mar., 1985), pp. 885-948. Cambridge: The Harvard Law Review Association.
Throughout our class discussion on Leif Wenar’s argument on the topic of property rights, the Clean Hands Trust that he proposes stood out to me. Although his proposal may seem ideal when written on paper, I had several questions regarding the execution of this Trust, should we ever attempt to realize it.
I think that he is trying to say that wilderness is something to be cherished and loved, because it gives definition and meaning to his life. His whole life was spent looking after and trying to preserve the wilderness. This is a plea for the preservation. I think that Leopold believes one day a lot of what we have today and he want it to be preserved so that in the future people have the chance to see there cultural inheritance like our ancestors let us see by preserving things.
Twomey, D. P., Jennings, M., & Anderson, R. A. (2011) Anderson’s business law and the legal
Terence Etherton (2008) – Constructive trusts: a new model for equity and unjust enrichment. Cambridge Law Journal
Foner, Eric, and John A. Garraty. "Homestead Act." The Reader's Companion to American History. Dec. 1 1991: n.p. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 06 Feb. 2014.
It is important that I make this very clear and that I do so at the earliest possible moment. I must do this because the essay that you are reading is about intellectual property, and that means that this essay must be self-referential. When one writes or speaks or communicates in any way about intellectual property, one is dealing with some of the most basic rules of the very medium in which one is operating. There is no neutral ground here, no possibility of genuine detachment or objectivity. Either I am going to claim the protection of the current laws that apply in the United States and under the World Intellectual Property Organization, or I am not.
Accessed 16/03/2012. http://www.law201.co.uk/95.pdfaccessed on 16/03/2012. http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199219742/01student/mindmaps/loveland_mindmaps_royal_prerogative.pdfaccessed on 17/03/2012. http://www.justice.gov.uk/royal-prerogative.pdf accessed on 17/03/2012. http://www.justice.gov.uk/royal-prerogative.pdf accessed on 18/03/2012.
...‘Consideration: Practical benefit and the Emperor’s new clothes’ in Beatson and Friedmann (eds). Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press, 1995);
[7] Cavendish Lawcards Series (2002) Company Law (3rd edn), p.15 [8] [1976] 3 All ER 462, CA. [9] Griffin, S. (1996) Company Law Fundamental Principles (2nd edn), p.19 [10] [1990] Ch 433. [11] Lecture notes [12] Lecture notes [13] [1939] 4 All ER 116.
According to Corporation Act 2001 s124(1), it illustrates that ‘’A company has the legal capacity and powers of an individual both in and outside the jurisdiction” . As it were, company as a legal individual must be freely with all its capital contribution shall embrace liability for its legal actions and obligations of the company’s shareholders is limited to its investment to the company. This ‘separate legal entity’ principle was established in the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1987] as company was held to have conducted the business as a legal person and separate from its members. It demonstrated that the debt of company is belonged to the company but not to the shareholders. Shareholders have only right to participate in managing but not in sharing the company property. Besides ,the Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] demonstrates that the distinction between the shareholders and company assets. It means that even Mr Macaura owned almost all the shares in the company, he had no insurable interest in the company’s asset. The other recent case is the Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] which illustrates that the distinct legal entities between employee ad director allows Mr.Lee function in dual capacities. It resulted that the corporation can contract with the controlling member of the corporation.
The courts of England and Wales acknowledge that the above must be something of value, in order to amount to consideration. A valuable consideration in the perspective of the English La...