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The challenger disaster
The challenger disaster
The 1986 challenger explosion
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The “Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster” was an event that was bound to happen. Unfortunately, seven astronauts lost their life in a failure that could have easily been prevented. The failure of the rocket booster O-rings gave way to gas leaks through the external fuel tank which caused the explosion. NASA has came a long way since 1986, however history cannot be erased. In my opinion, this failure traces back to the management. It doesn't make sense to me that an O.K. to launch was given after insufficient testing, lack of communication, and disapproval from others involved in the build. The wrong people must have been given the wrong responsibilities. After reading the background, I can only think that the ones in charge were racing with time, considering economic & political …show more content…
Joint rotation problems and O-ring erosion were discovered and somewhat brushed to the side. Weather was also considered with these problems. Morton- Thiokol manufactured the rocket boosters. However, the engineers who built the boosters had doubts of proper function. Especially within sub-freezing temperatures. Also showing why there was numerous launch delays. The night before the launch, a teleconference was held between engineers and management from Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, and Morton- Thiokol. The Engineers specifically stated that the cold weather would cause problems with O-ring seating and joint rotation. After heated arguments, NASA managers decided to approve the boosters for launch. The night of the launch, temperatures were as low as 8 degrees Fahrenheit. And 72 seconds after lift off, the Challenger exploded. My observations are very clear. The wrong people were in charge of this operation. There was every reason for NASA not to launch and they still decided to. Unfortunately, we cannot change the past but we can change the
On October 19, 2007 in the Korangal Valley, Kunar, Afghanistan the 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne) of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team began Operation Rock Avalanche. During the operation two Americans were killed and five were wounded. Although the operation did not have a massive impact on the War in Afghanistan it was extremely important to the Armed Services because it resulted in the first living Medal of Honor recipient since Vietnam, Salvatore Giunta and it help lead to the withdraw from the Korangal Valley.
...afety should have inspected the building prior to issuing permits for further renovation, especially knowing this structure was going to be housing 124 residents. It seems that lack of knowledge from prior owners and lack of responsibility of city officials are responsible for this collapse and sadly, the loss of 9 brave men in the line of duty. The Boston Fire Department could have worked closer with the owner/ construction crew at the Hotel Vendome, and the deficiencies would have been found, and they would have known the instability they were walking into on June 17. At that point, firefighting operations would have more than likely been defensive. The firefighters did not conduct pre-incident planning which would have let them know they were going to face the construction barriers while attempting to lay hose, maneuver hose, and get the hose to a water source.
Regina:The Early Years. (2014). Cyclone of 1912. Regina: The Early Years 1880 -1950. Retrieved March 7, 2014, from http://scaa.usask.ca/gallery/regina/central/cyclone.html
NASA has faced many tragedies during their time; but one can question if two of the tragedies were preventable by changing some critical decisions made by the organization. The investigation board looking at the decisions made for the space shuttle tragedies of the Columbia and Challenger noted that the “loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical failures” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 191). The two space shuttle tragedies were about twenty years apart, they both had technical failures but politics also played a factor in to these two tragedies.
Even though there were many factors contributing to the Challenger disaster, the most important issue was the lack of an effective risk management plan. The factors leading to the Challenger disaster are:
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia was lost due to structural failure in the left wing. On take-off, it was reported that a piece of foam insulation surrounding the shuttle fleet's 15-story external fuel tanks fell off of Columbia's tank and struck the shuttle's left wing. Extremely hot gas entered the front of Columbia's left wing just 16 seconds after the orbiter penetrated the hottest part of Earth's atmosphere on re-entry. The shuttle was equipped with hundreds of temperature sensors positioned at strategic locations. The salvaged flight recorded revealed that temperatures started to rise in the left wing leading edge a full minute before any trouble on the shuttle was noted. With a damaged left wing, Columbia started to drag left. The ships' flight control computers fought a losing battle trying to keep Columbia's nose pointed forward.
R. M. Boisjoly had over a quarter-century’s experience in the aerospace industry in 1985 when he became involved in an improvement effort on the O-ring which connect segments of Morton Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Booster. This was used to bring the Space Shuttle into orbit (OEC, 2006). Morton Thiokol is an aerospace company that manufactures the solid propellant rocket motors used to launch the Challenger (Skubik). Boisjoly authored a memo to R.L. Lund, Vice President of Engineering and four others, in regards to his concerns about the flawed O-ring erosion problem. His warnings were ignored leading to the deaths of six astronauts and one social studies teacher.
Civil Engineering Failure: Sultana Disaster (1865) Matthew Oxley Honors Introduction to Engineering Design Severna Park High School Table of Contents Abstract.........................................3 Death on the Dark River: The Story of the Sultana Disaster...............4 The Ship...................................6 Ethics & Cause (with further explanation)....................... 6 Policy/Regulation Change............................ 7 Conclusion........................................8 References........................................9
Even though people knew what had happened, they didn't know why it had happened. Gradually people found the answer. Here's why it happened: the rocket booster's casing was made in different sections. These sections were attached to each other and sealed together with o-rings-rubber rings. The o-rings were held in their places by the pressure of the hot gasses, which were from the rocket booster after it was ignited. On previous missions of the Challenger, the o-rings were found to be worn away by the hot gasses. The o-rings had been tested and the results had shown that the o-rings were a lot more likely to fail in cold or freezing weather. That was what happened on the cold morning of January 28, 1986.
not on the outside. All I wanted to do was find someone, get a story,
There was a failure to communicate across departments and branches, to write software that assumed software is fallible, and a failure to document reasons for doing any of these things (Lions,
When looking at that, there are some questions to be asked, did Roger Boisjoly act ethically as a whistle-blower? Was Boisjoly treated fairly by Morton Thiokol? Could the managers of Morton Thiokol have done anything differently? To start, did Boisjoly act ethically? In my opinion, Boisjoly did all that he could to prevent the launch of the Challenger. He informed his managers of the defect and the probability of an explosion. He consulted all internal channels and had evidence. Sadly, his managers ultimately ignored him and went ahead with the launch. As we know, that resulted in an explosion as predicted. When outside sources questioned Boisjoly about the incident, he was truthful and told them all of his predictions and gave evidence. Next, was Boisjoly treated fairly by Morton Thiokol? To me, Boisjoly's employers did not give him the respect he deserved. He found a problem and informed them of it. The managers of Thiokol did not listen and it resulted in a loss. Later, after Boisjoly blew the whistle, his work environment changed and he was treated differently. Lastly, could the managers of Thiokol have made different decisions? Yes, the Morton Thiokol managers should have researched the problem and found an answer before going ahead with the launch. The had been informed that there was a malfunction and if NASA decided to go ahead with the launch it could potentially
This tragic accident was preventable by not only the flight crew, but maintenance and air traffic control personnel as well. On December 29, 1972, ninety-nine of the one hundred and seventy-six people onboard lost their lives needlessly. As is the case with most accidents, this one was certainly preventable. This accident is unique because of the different people that could have prevented it from happening. The NTSB determined that “the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew.” This is true; the flight crew did fail, however, others share the responsibility for this accident. Equally responsible where maintenance personnel, an Air Traffic Controllers, the system, and a twenty cent light bulb. What continues is a discussion on, what happened, why it happened, what to do about it and what was done about it.
According to David Abrahams, senior vice-president of Marsh Risk Consulting Practice and an expert in brand risk, there is often a demonstrable link between the way in which a crisis is handled by a company and what happens to that business and its associated brand. 'The way in which any crisis is handled becomes a visible test of management capability,' he says. 'If that crisis arises from a fundamental breach of trust or performance, the compound effect of the bad handling can be devastating.'