Canadian Voting System

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On May 12th, 2009, British Columbia voted to change its provincial electoral system from First Past the Post (FPTP) to Single Transferable Vote (STV). Proposed by the Citizen’s Assembly for Electoral Reform, the switch to STV was intended to create a Legislative Assembly that better represented the political wishes of BC voters. Despite the potential benefits that switching to STV would likely create however, the referendum failed, with almost 61% of voters voting to keep the FPTP system. As polls conducted prior to the referendum indicated, support for the switch increased drastically when voters were more educated on the differences and merits of both FPTP and STV (Roy, 2009). Therefore, it could be inferred that the referendum failed due …show more content…

First, as exampled by the 2009 BC referendum, the voting system must be simple enough for the average voter to understand without difficulty. In addition to a higher likelihood of failing in a referendum, a more complicated voting system would quite possibly lead to a lower voter turnout, which would result in a less than ideal election. Second, the government formed from an election should represent as close as possible the results of the voters. If only 37% of the population votes for a party, that party should not have effectively 100% of the power. Finally, the parliamentary system should encourage discussion of differing and minority views, rather than stifling them. The remainder of this paper will focus on analyzing different voting systems that have been proposed to be implemented within Canada. I will evaluate them under the above conditions, before proposing one that I believe would be best to …show more content…

This voting method takes a radically different approach that the above mentioned majoritarian system, and does away with the riding system completely. Rather than listing candidates for a riding, ballots now contain a list of federal political parties. When votes are tallied, seats in the House of Commons are then assigned in a manner that ensures that the makeup of the house matches as closely as possible the percentage of the popular vote each individual party received. This method improves hugely on the aforementioned systems – while it maintains the simplicity of FPTP and AV (in fact, as voters now need to only pick a party rather than a person, it may be even simpler), it also solves many of their shortcomings. As votes are assigned proportionally, the resulting seat distribution following an election would be much closer to the wishes of the general population than a winner-takes-all method such as FPTP. A proportional representation would encourage smaller minority party participation, thus facilitating discussion and negotiation within the House of Commons. For example, the recent Dutch election had 13 separate parties win seats within the House of Representatives, per official results. One of the major drawbacks of a purely proportional system, however, is that it weakens the link between constituents and their MPs (Reynolds, 2003, pp. 66). Voters would no longer have the direct

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