Animal Reflection

2. Before this week’s lesson, I had never given any consideration to whether or not nonhuman animals had any moral standing. Prior to this class, if asked whether I thought they did or not, I most likely would have said that I do not feel they do; however, after serious consideration, I would now have to say that I do think that nonhuman animals have moral standing. At least some of them do.

I feel that some animals are more capable of acting morally than others. Many animals act simply out of natural impulse or training, but I do feel that there are some that are capable of doing something simply because they feel that it is right. For example, a lion acts out of innate instinct. For them, they do not kill a gazelle because it is moral or not, but because they are hungry and need to survive. They would not refuse to kill something because it was the wrong thing to do, but merely because there was no reason to.

An ape, on the other hand, I feel is capable of doing something because they have a sense that it is right. They may not be able to cognitively understand morality or ethical behavior, but they can do things to please others.

I am not sure exactly what sets some apart from others. I would say that as an animal

In this theory, lessening distress is ethically respectable, regardless of whether the suffering affects an adult, a child, or an animal. If it has the ability to feel pain, then it is due moral concern and needs to be considered in moral judgement making. The utilitarian view of moral agency assumes that all living creatures are due moral concern. Much like the views of Tom Regan’s Kantian account of animal rights, even those creatures without the ability to rationalize, such as a dog or cat, are afforded moral concern, as they are able to