Analysis Of Kinzer's The Overthrow

The main purpose of a historian is to show facets of continuity and change over time of his or her object of study. Along with the concise historian, Kinzer establishes his ability to report history and storytelling. In his book, The Overthrow, he uses oral records and personal communications as his primary sources. He refers to quotes from records and interviews to tell the story of each intervention, Kinzer depicts characters, like presidents and administrators, in a more humane light then of their usual opaque appearance. In his writing, historical characters are not just defined as demonized, but rather described as humane because of certain circumstances that encouraged them to make the decisions that they did. Kinzer is by no means cautious about where he wants the reader to end up: "The invasion of Iraq in 2003," he writes in the second paragraph of the introduction, "was not an isolated episode. It was the culmination of a 110-year period during which Americans overthrew fourteen governments that displeased them for various ideological, political, and economic reasons." Kinzer proclaims that the operations including Iraq have been seen as successful, the vast majority have had consequences unintended. This assertion is made clear in the histories of Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippines, Nicaragua, Honduras, Iran, Guatemala, South Vietnam, Chile, Panama and Afghanistan and Iraq. Kinzer’s argument becomes more solidified by the time he mentions Afghanistan and Iraq. While the Overthrow shows the continuity of US participation in foreign regime changes, the book is divided into three chronological parts; the imperial era, Covert action, and Invasion, each will be further analyzed in the following lines. Kinzer argues, that each part...

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... strategies, CIA run uprisings to out undesirable leader. Like previous overthrows, the Cold War regime changes occurred "only when economic interests coincided with ideological ones." The CIA is a dogmatic instrument used, but perceived as an independent immoral and dishonorable force during the Cold War, that lead regime in the fight against civil liberties and insurgence. In the regards to the CIA, Kinzer shines light to the similarities amongst the event and role of the CIA in the Chilean Coup against Salvador Allende in 1973. The CIA abided by the rules and did as they were told even, when personnel cautioned the intervention. Not only was the brutal dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet proof of this sentiment, but when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigated the coup in years after, it found president Nixon, not the CIA, most responsible.