Analysis Of Dena S. Davis's Choosing For Disability

In the “Choosing for Disability” by Dena S. Davis, the main thesis is centered on the moral implications of parents purposefully wanting the genetic makeup of their children to reflect their own disability through the use of genetic medicine. I will proceed to summarize the arguments of the thesis in respect to genetic ethics and then critique it on the basis of autonomy. Firstly, Davis analyzes the condition of Deafness and whether it constitutes a disability (harm) or a cultural identity. Davis outlines several viewpoints from the perspective of Deaf advocates who defend the Deaf culture movement. This perspective regards medical interventions, such as the use of cochlear implants and surgical hearing aids, as unethical and detrimental

In her argument, the author uses autonomy as the basis for the concept of moral harm. The preservation of autonomy here is specifically for the possible child in that a decision made by the parents is recognized to be a moral harm when it violates the child’s right to liberty and ability to self-determine. In making an argument that defends and preserves a child’s autonomy, Davis does not adequately take into account the autonomy of parents to determine how they choose to bring their own children into the world. It is natural for parents to want their offspring to resemble themselves and Davis severely discredits Deaf parents for deliberately wanting to produce a Deaf child, since Deafness is considered to be a significant harm. Davis’ construction of how Deafness is a significant harm is overwhelmingly unpersuasive and generalized, with overemphasis on Deaf children’s “dismal” reading skills. There are plenty of cases of Deaf individuals successfully earning master and doctorate degrees, occupying a variety of respectable occupations, and doing work within the dominant Hearing social sphere. Being Deaf does not always lead to a lesser reading proficiency, limited employment opportunities, and inabilities to cross cultural boundaries like the causal relationship that Davis is desperately trying to establish. Based on her construction of moral harm, would it also be morally unacceptable for Hearing parents to deliberately wanting to produce a Hearing offspring through the use of genetic manipulations when the child is predisposed to be Deaf? Davis’ stance on moral harms as violations to a person’s right to an open future is biased in that the standard is not equally applicable both ways and tends to be in favor of the Hearing community. In addition, the author’s argument in favor of autonomy for the possible child does not address the “rational persons” aspect of autonomy for cases can made against