Barbara Montero is an associate professor of philosophy at the City University of New York. In her article “Post-Physicalism” she aims to convince people, mainly physicalists, to begin thinking of the mind/body problem from a new perspective. Montero reasons that the term “physical” is too difficult a term to define, which leads to a serious flaw of the direction of physicalist arguments. Her main idea is that the mind/body problem is really the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, not a fundamentally physical world. Directing the question towards “Is mentality a fundamental feature of the world?”, in her opinion, relieves the conflict between naturalism and ontological significance, and paves the way
In her article, “Lecture Me. Really”, Molly Worthen addresses the issue college students know all too well: how to lecture properly. Published in the New York Times, Worthen writes a passionate article about lecturing but from the perspective of a professor. Worthen presents the idea that lecturing, although some may think ineffective in the classroom, is a way to truly challenge and engage students into critically thinking. Worth dictates this idea with an excellent build up logical argument but lacks the proper evidence to support her claims creating a faulty argument.
The Emancipation of the once enslaved African American was the first stepping stone to the America that we know of today. Emancipation did not, however automatically equate to equality, as many will read from the awe-inspiring novel Passing Strange written by the talented Martha Sandweiss. The book gives us, at first glance, a seemingly tall tale of love, deception, and social importance that color played into the lives of all Americans post-emancipation. The ambiguity that King, the protagonist, so elegantly played into his daily life is unraveled, allowing a backstage view of the very paradox that was Charles King’s life.
The philosophical theory of dualism holds that mind and body are two separate entities. While dualism presupposes that the two ‘substances’ may interact, it contrasts physicalism by refusing to denote correlation between body and mind as proof of identity. Comparing the two theories, dualism’s invulnerable proof of the existence of qualia manages to evade arguments from physicalism. While a common argument against qualia—non-physical properties defined in Jackson’s Knowledge Argument—targets the unsound nature of epiphenomenalism, this claim is not fatal to the theory of dualism as it contains claims of causation and fails to stand resolute to the conceivability of philosophical zombies. This essay argues that epiphenomenalism, while often designated as a weakness when present in an argument, can remain in valid arguments from qualia.
Taylor, Richard. "The Mind as a Function of the Body." Exploring Philosophy. 4th ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2012. 131-138. Print.
In Searle’s first argument against the distinction between the mental and physical, he assumes this mistaken assumption is largely due to one’s common-sense supposition that there indeed is a distinction between the mental and physical at some deep metaphysical level. Searle confronts this assumption with the simple fact that he believes Consciousness it is a systematic biological phenomenon, much like digestion, and as such, concludes, that consciousness is a feature of the brain as such such is part of the physical world. However, I agree with Searle in the sense that the through simple reduction there incidentally will be a metaphysical distinction between mental and physical, however I disagree with the way in which he counters this.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
...of the body, and no problem arises of how soul and body can be united into a substantial whole: ‘there is no need to investigate whether the soul and the body are one, any more than the wax and the shape, or in general the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter; for while “one” and “being” are said in many ways, the primary [sense] is actuality’ (De anima 2.1, 12B6–9).Many twentieth-century philosophers have been looking for just such a via media between materialism and dualism, at least for the case of the human mind; and much scholarly attention has gone into asking whether Aristotle’s view can be aligned with one of the modern alternatives, or whether it offers something preferable to any of the modern alternatives, or whether it is so bound up with a falsified Aristotelian science that it must regretfully be dismissed as no longer a live option.
Are minds physical things, or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will? Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality, selfish? (Sober 203). These are questions relevant to philosophy of the mind and discussed through a variety of arguments. Two of the most important arguments with this discussion are Cartesian dualism and logical behaviorism, both of which argue the philosophy of the mind in two completely different ways. Robert Lane, a professor at the University of West Georgia, define the two as follows: Cartesian dualism is the theory that the mind and body are two totally different things, capable of existing separately, and logical behaviorism is the theory that our talk about beliefs, desires, and pains is not talk about ghostly or physical inner episodes, but instead about actual and potential patterns of behavior. Understanding of the two arguments is essential to interpret the decision making process; although dualism and behaviorism are prominent arguments for the philosophy of the mind, both have their strengths and weaknesses.
The 'mind-body' problem has troubled philosophers for centuries. This is because no human being has been able to sufficiently explain how the mind actually works and how this mind relates to the body - most importantly to the brain. If this were not true then there would not be such heated debates on the subject. No one objects to the notion that the Earth revolves around the sun because it is empirical fact. However, there is no current explanation on the mind that can be accepted as fact. In 'What is it like to be a bat?', Thomas Nagel does not attempt to solve this 'problem'. Instead, he attempts to reject the reductionist views with his argument on subjectivity. He examines the difficulties of the mind-body problem by investigating the conscious experience of an organism, which is usually ignored by the reductionists. Unfortunately, his arguments contain some flaws but they do shed some light as to why the physicalist view may never be able to solve the mind-body problem.
For our convenience, we shall call physical the experiences turned in the direction of the material band and mental the ones turned in the direction of desire.
There are two main theories regarding the body Cartesian dualism and the embodiment theory which are vastly different. The Cartesian dualism theory is that the mind and body are two separate entities, the body the subject of science and the mind the subject of theology and religion. The embodiment theory constructed by social construction theorists (Embodiment scholars) is that the body is spatially, temporally and socio-culturally dependent. The embodiment theory has a framework which is said to be what the individual embodies, these are the physiological body, clinical body, phenomenological body and social body which will be described in this essay.
When we think of the mind and the body psychologist and historians have provided theories that correlate these two ideas and their functions that make us humans. Without the mind our body cannot fulfill its purposes and without the body our mind is left useless. These two branches influence each other and can cause different chains of reaction to erupt in our mental world [mind] and our physical world [body]. There are relationships between what we experience, (such as thoughts and feelings) and what our biological processes are (such as activity in the nervous system), (Morris, 2005). The link between the mind-body is that they are not separate entities, rather they are intricately connected, interacting with each other to function properly. The five basic issues that psychologist have associated the mind-body with are biological psych (dealing with the nervous system and its function), sensation/perception, consciousness, motivation/emotion, and clinical psych (dealing with disorders/therapy).
While the great philosophical distinction between mind and body in western thought can be traced to the Greeks, it is to the influential work of René Descartes, French mathematician, philosopher, and physiologist, that we owe the first systematic account of the mind/body relationship. As the 19th century progressed, the problem of the relationship of mind to brain became ever more pressing.
An alternative theory to integration of bodies is that of Cartesian Dualism, an idea that divides the body into a ‘palpable body’ and a ‘tangible mind’ (Scheper‐Hughes, N., & Lock, M. 1987, ...
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.