Absolutism In 1989-91

868 Words2 Pages

The shocking collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-91 has often been an indicator in the West as a triumph of capitalism and democracy, as though this event was clearly a direct result of the policies of the Reagan and Thatcher governments. This arrogant analysis has little relation to measurable facts, circumstances, and internal political shifts that were the real historical causes of the deterioration of the Soviet empire and ultimately the Soviet state itself. Spirited political speeches and tough calculating postures make good theater, but they are ineffective at forcing political change in totalitarian nations, as is proven by the stamina of far less powerful Communist regimes in Cuba and east Asia in the face of punishing trade embargos. …show more content…

In 1988 visit to Poland, Gorbachev made clear that he had no intention of using military force to prop up the Communist regime there, in a striking departure from the Brezhnev doctrine. He followed up with a remarkable speech to the UN in December of that year, promising to withdraw tens of thousands of Soviet troops, tanks and artillery systems from Eastern Europe, in order to convince the world that the USSR no longer had large scale offensive military capability in Europe. This Soviet policy shift handicapped the negotiating position of the Polish Communist Party, which agreed to let the independent union Solidarity run candidates against them in free elections in April 1989. Solidarity had long received covert financial and advisory support from the Vatican and the United States, allowing it to survive long enough to attain this accomplishment. Ultimately, however, the outcome was in the hands of the Polish electorate, who were widely anticipated to support a Communist majority. Instead, Solidarity candidates shockingly won every contested seat, despite having been out spent considerably by their …show more content…

A variety of causes went into this decision, including the cost and benefit of direct military occupation, the weaknesses exposed in Afghanistan, and the liberalizing tendencies of Gorbachev. It is not clear how much of the bloc the Soviets would have been able to hold by force, but they certainly made an intentional strategic decision in relinquishing all of it. For their part, Communist governments were under popular pressure not to rely on foreign military support, so they asked for Soviet withdrawal as a last attempt to defend the legitimacy of their rule. If the Soviets hoped the Communist regimes would survive without military intervention, this turned out to be a great

Open Document