All three theories by Heidegger, Bookchin, and Naess are based on the normative assumption: humans perceived themselves as being distinct from a world that unites both humans and non-humans. To better understand the distinguishments that each author makes in his theory, I will reconstruct each of their assumption. After that, we will explore the rational fashioning of integrative ways and the problems that it raises. In conclusion, there may be a reiteration of the assumption in our effort to act ethically according to the ecosystem.
Heidegger’s theory orbits around the idea that humans are mortal stewards of things on the earth. He believes that humans should consider and respect non-human life forms as part of this comprehensive world in all dimensions of earth, sky, divinities, and their roles in their relative locations. In the same manner, non-humans share an undiscriminating relationship closely knit together in a network by their functions and bestowals. Because of this proximity, human’s stewardship should not promote egocentricity or superiority over non-human items. This responsibility does not seek selfish coercion, but deferential regards to such items in order to bring forth diversity and life. His assumption here implies that humans are like tenants responsible to take care of the rest of the earth as a shared home for all living things. Along with this heuristic, Heidegger supports the saving, preserving, dwelling, building, and integrating of our daily lives with respect to the whole earth.
Similarly, Bookchin believes in a respectful co-evolving community of life on earth. His theory of social ecology characterized humans as citizens of a community. Although he does not press on equality like Naess does in...
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... life for all or do we seek to use our power and values to dominate? If our treatment of our own kind is considered unjust, consider how our treatment of non-human life forms must be. As I have mentioned earlier, the consequences of our actions and values may be backfired at us and passed to future generations. Perhaps we are ignorant towards the outcome of the transformation we impose on non-human life or perhaps we are, unfortunately, ignorant towards the destruction of our own flourishing of life.
Work Cited
Sessions, George. “Arne Naess: The Deep Ecological Movement.” Deep Ecology for the 21st
Century. Ed. George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publication, Inc., 1995. 64-84. Print.
Sessions, George. “Arne Naess: The Eight Points Revisited.” Deep Ecology for the 21st Century. Ed. George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publication, Inc., 1995. 213-221. Print.
Being human means to be unique and to be constantly striving for a better life. The community is shaped by every individual’s desire and path to acquire a life worth living. The individual’s desire for a fulfilled life is molded by the interactions and experiences one may encounter. It is through these experiences, that one discovers his or her place within their community. However, just because the individual is striving for the best that life can offer, does not mean that the ideas and morals of the individual coincide with that of the collective community. Through this potential dissonance between the human and community, one may find that the achievement of a life lived to the fullest is brought about by the resolution of conflict between
Thesis statement: Nature is not only for the human race, but it provides habitat to millions of organisms and human race is just one of the organisms,
2. Affection for the variety and mystery of human existence; we must not force sameness upon humanity, and avoid “narrowing uniformity and equalitarianism.” (8)
In order words, Nature is beautiful in the more simple way, but at the same time if nature starts to recognize danger or the feeling of dying, she will defend herself. Humanity need the use of ethics and humility at the same time in order to have a good ecological environment. During “Thinking Like A Mountain” Leopold describes the intricate of a mountain’s biomes and the consequences of disturbing their ecological balances, describe specifically with a wolf and a deer. Leopold use the wolf and the deer as an example of how human treats nature. Referring to the wolf way of think, “he has not learned to think like a mountain” like humanity has not learned to think in the way that Mother Nature want us to think (140). Leopold describes how “a land, ethic, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and… Reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land” giving an exact example by having a group A and a group B (258). Group A describes what one needs when on the other hand, group B “worries about a whole series of biotic side-issues” (259). By having this two groups being described, humanity today is like the group A, when one really need to change their way of mind and start to be like the group B. Society needs to use the ethics with humility in order to conserve the health of the natural
The moral community is comprised of a body of people who are self-aware enough to make moral decisions and contribute to and obey moral mandates laid down by the community. According to philosopher Carl Cohen, human beings are the only known moral creatures that, "lay down moral laws; for others and for themselves. Human beings are self-legislative, morally auto-nomous" (897). It is important to distinguish that it is being self-legislative and morally autonomous and not the mere fact of being biologically human that distinguishes members of the moral community. Theoretically, any species of creatures that had the same measure of self-awareness and moral thought should be granted equal membership into the moral community and all the privileges that member...
For as prey is almost the unique subject of fighting among carnivorous animals, and as frugivorous ones live among themselves in continual peace, if the human race were of this latter genus it clearly would have had much greater ease subsisting in the state of nature, and less need and occasion to leave it. (Rousseau 188)
What do we, as humans have to do in order to give nonhuman animals the proper treatment and equal moral consideration as we owe for other humans? Some, such as Jeremy Bentham would address that, “The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation” (99). Other moral philosophers, like Henry Sidgwick, however reject the theory of utilitarianism thinking that is pleasure all that really matters and are consequences all that matters (111-112)? Humans use nonhuman animals for one purpose; pleasure from using their skins for luxury goods. In this paper, I will explain and examine what Jeremy Bentham is trying explain in his argument, and will attempt to show that his argument is a plausible one, by replying an objection against his utilitarian view.
with regards to its analysis of the place of human beings in nature, whether the
Taylor believes that if one concedes and accepts the first three components then acceptance of the fourth component is not unreasonable. He also suggests that in order to adopt the attitude of respect for nature one must accept all four elements of the biocentric outlook. “Once we reject the claim that humans are superior either in merit or in worth to other living things, we are ready to adopt the attitude of respect. The denial of human superiority is itself the result of taking the perspective on nature built into the first three elements of the biocentric outlook” (Taylor 153). This is where Taylor is mistaken. I will argue in the subsequent paper that humans, as a condition of moral agency, are superior to other living things and that one does not need to accept Taylor’s fourth element in order to adopt the attitude of respect for nature.
Analyzing human obligation pertaining to all that is not man made, apart from humans, we discover an assortment of concerns, some of which have been voiced by philosophers such as Tom Regan, Peter Singer and Aldo Leopold. Environmentally ethical ideals hold a broad spectrum of perspectives that, not only attempt to identify a problem, but also focus on how that problem is addressed through determining what is right and wrong.
Why do we other and is there an ethical way to live with the other in an increasingly diverse world? In Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, Kwame Anthony Appiah considers otherness as coming from two interconnected concepts: first, the other are those who are not local or related to us; second, we perceive the other to have a conflicting set of values to our own. However, Appiah contends that the values between a group and an other are not significantly different. As for an ethical means of living together with the other, Appiah puts forth the concept of cosmopolitanism, which has two fundamental ideas: that we have an obligation of concern for others; and a respect for what he refers to as “legitimate difference” (Appiah: xv).
Ecologists formulate their scientific theories influenced by ethical values, and in turn, environmental ethicists value nature based on scientific theories. Darwinian evolutionary theory provides clear examples of these complex links, illustrating how these reciprocal relationships do not constitute a closed system, but are undetermined and open to the influences of two broader worlds: the sociocultural and the natural environment. On the one hand, the Darwinian conception of a common evolutionary origin and ecological connectedness has promoted a respect for all forms of life. On the other hand, the metaphors of struggle for existence and natural selection appear as problematic because they foist onto nature the Hobbesian model of a liberal state, a Malthusian model of the economy, and the productive practice of artificial selection, all of which reaffirm modern individualism and the profit motive that are at the roots of our current environmental crisis. These metaphors were included in the original definitions of ecology and environmental ethics by Haeckel and Leopold respectively, and are still pervasive among both ecologists and ethicists. To suppose that these Darwinian notions, derived from a modern-liberal worldview, are a fact of nature constitutes a misleading interpretation. Such supposition represents a serious impediment to our aim of transforming our relationship with the natural world in order to overcome the environmental crisis. To achieve a radical transformation in environmental ethics, we need a new vision of nature.
A human induced global ecological crisis is occurring, threatening the stability of this earth and its inhabitants. The best path to address environmental issues both effectively and morally is a dilemma that raises concerns over which political values are needed to stop the deterioration of the natural environment. Climate change; depletion of resources; overpopulation; rising sea levels; pollution; extinction of species is just to mention a few of the damages that are occurring. The variety of environmental issues and who and how they affect people and other species is varied, however the nature of environmental issues has the potential to cause great devastation. The ecological crisis we face has been caused through anthropocentric behavior that is advantageous to humans, but whether or not anthropocentric attitudes can solve environmental issues effectively is up for debate. Ecologism in theory claims that in order for the ecological crisis to be dealt with absolutely, value and equality has to be placed in the natural world as well as for humans. This is contrasting to many of the dominant principles people in the contemporary world hold, which are more suited to the standards of environmentalism and less radical approaches to conserving the earth. I will argue in this essay that whilst ecologism could most effectively tackle environmental problems, the moral code of ecologism has practical and ethical defects that threaten the values and progress of anthropocentricism and liberal democracy.
...sions essential for survival. In order to live peacefully, one must adapt one’s social and behavioral needs. Like the “literalized” accounts of survival by Jean Améry or Elie Wiesel, If This Is a Man has served as a reference for numerous interpretations and reflections in the fields of cultural studies and philosophy.
* Daily, Gretchen C., ed. Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1997.