The description theory of meaning was proposed independently by Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege as a response to some of the fallacies of the reference theory. Description theorists propose that instead of being a simple ‘word - world relationship’, meaning is derived from descriptions associated with certain objects and stored in our mind (or senses in Frege’s case). Frege and Russell’s accounts of the theory differ subtly in how they view descriptions. Several objections have been made against the theory, but only the most important objections will be raised. These include Strawson’s objection to the attributive use. Also, the problems of ignorance and error raised by Kripke tarnish the description theory’s attractiveness. The Twin-Earth thought experiment is decisively refutes the theory.
The Description Theory of Meaning
The description theory of meaning replaced the overly simplified reference theory, which posited that meaning was derived from a word-world relationship. There were however, many faults with the reference theory. The description theory however, surpassed it by claiming that meaning was psychological, stored as a description of the referent. Bertrand Russell’s analysis of the definite article, ‘the’, led to his analysis of definite descriptions. He broke all definite descriptions, expressions like ‘the golden handshake’ or ‘the king of pop’, into 3 statements on the basis of logical analysis. For example, ‘the king of pop is Michael Jackson’ is broken into the statements:
1. There is at least one king of pop
2. There is at most one king of pop
3. Whoever is king of pop is Michael Jackson
This analysis helps Russell to avoid some of the pitfalls of the Reference Theory. Four particularly damaging...
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Websites
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: Narrow Mental Content - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-narrow/ 02/04/11
Stanford Encycopaedia of Philosophy: Gottlob Frege - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ 05/04/11
ABSTRACT: Indeterminacy theories, such as Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy principle on rules and language and Quine's indeterminacy of radical translation, raise some fundamental questions on our knowledge and understanding. In this paper we try to outline and interpret Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy, and then compare it to some other related theories on indeterminacy of human thinking, such as raised by Hume, Quine, and Goodman.
As such, I believe that I have provided potential alternatives to the question that the argument from vagueness attempts to solve. While the arguments that I have provided for the alternatives are prone to errors, the goal is to show that it is possible to entertain such alternatives as opposed to accepting universalism, and hence four-dimensionalism. As the non-temporal argument suffers from this weakness, so too does the temporal one.
Thirdly, some of Ned Blocks objections to the Higher Order Thought Theory will be considered and review in order to reaffirm the validity of the main argument. Block's objections will be taken as the main challenge to Rosenthal's HO theory....
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Irvin, Andrew. "Bertand Russell." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. N.p., 18 Oct 2013. Web. 22 Mar 2014. .
So that there can be falsehood a relation must involve someone judging or believing. Russell uses Othello as an example in this relation "Desdemona 's love for Cassio" this does not truly exist, what does exist is the relation of Othello 's mind with the objects in the belief which are Desdemona, loving, Cassio and Othello, this is a relation of four terms. Belief is the relation that Othello has to all of these terms, his act of believing unites all of these terms into a complex whole. Belief is what relates the objects or "constituents" Cassio, Desdemona and loving together with the judge or object Othello. There is also a direction or order in which the objects are placed this is acknowledge by "Cassio loves Desdemona" being a different statement then "Desdemona loves Cassio." Within the statement "Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio," It is not loving which forms the complex but how the object relates to the subjects that creates the complex unity in this case it is Othello 's act of believing that cements the relation between the subject and objects. This leads Russell to the conclusion that beliefs are true when correspond to an associated complex and false they aren 't. This is the nature of truth. The constituents are put in an order that are united by a relation which in the case of Othello is "Loving" which are also the objects of the belief. This complex unity is referred to as the " fact corresponding to the belief" meaning that statements are true when and if there are existing corresponding
The problem I hope to expose in this paper is the lack of evidence in The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds supporting that A, a thought or feeling, is the only cause of B. Russell believes that there are other minds because he can see actions in others that are analogous to his own without thinking about them. He believes that all actions are caused by thoughts, but what happens when we have a reaction resulting as an action of something forced upon one’s self? Such as when a doctor hits your patellar tendon with a reflex hammer to test your knee-jerk reflex. Russell does not answer this question. He is only “highly probable” that we are to know other minds exist through his A is the cause of B postulate.
Furthermore, another theory in this debate according to Harris and Shaw (2000) is that the UCR is primaril...
. Its most famous defender is Descartes, who argues that as a subject of conscious thought and experience, he cannot consist simply of spatially extended matter. His essential nature must be non-m...
The aim of this essay is to give an exposition of the theory of descriptions as it is first set forth by Russell in his article 'On Denoting' found in Mind 1905.
Donnellen (1966) criticized the Russell and Strawson’s view. He claimed that there are attributive and referential uses of definite description. The former is about attributively using definite description in an assertion which stating something about “A is B”. The latter is about speaker using the description to let the audience to know what is “A is B” about. Donnellen claimed that Russell focus on former and Strawson focus on latter.
Russell’s Theory of Definite Description has totally changed the way we view definite descriptions by solving the three logical paradoxes. It is undeniable that the theory itself is not yet perfect and there can be objections on this theory. Still, until now, Russell’s theory is the most logical explanation of definite description’s role.
Russell uses a method of cross referencing our sensory data and our knowledge of certain realities in order to define what we can really know what exists. Russell uses the phrase “sense data to differentiate the difference between reality and appearance. Sense data is the information that our senses take in during an act of sensation, such as smelling or seeing. When you walk into a kitchen, you smell the food, see the color of the table tops, and feel the heat from the stove you intake different sense data of the kitchen. Sense data are the mental images and memories that we obtain from a particular object in the real physical world. As shown in the chair example, one object can have a multitude of sense data. Sense data are correlated to the objects they represent. Howev...
Perception is the process by which we grasp useful information about the external world through the senses. Armstrong argues in ‘Perception and Belief’ that perceptual experience is a disposition to form beliefs about the real world. The argument from illusion shows that perceptual knowledge is a misrepresentation of the world because external objects may have qualities they do not really possess. This is due to various experiences that are caused by hallucinations or by the influence of drugs. Given that reality can easily be altered by such cases, perception does not seem to represent a direct window onto the world. To overcome this problem, some philosophers like Russell postulated the sense datum theory as an object that stands in relation between the perceiver and an external object. Moreover, this view asserts that the perceiver is never in direct contact with reality but is in a continuous mental state that prevents him to see the world as it is. Hence, the perceiver is not deceived by the illusory cases because there is no objective world to be derived from. Armstrong rejects this theory by appeal to the indeterminacy principle and raises claims to support the reliability of perception as the acquisition of potential belief. On Armstrong’s view, the number of background inferences justifies the validity of perceptual beliefs with respect to providing knowledge of the external world. In ‘Sensation and Perception’, Dretske argues that perception and belief are not inextricably bound simply because belief requires a cognitive refined process of informational input while perception involves the casual flow of raw data not yet processed by the cognitive mechanisms. On Dretske’s view, a sui generis conception of perception tha...
However, although Strawson’s views describe the subject in terms of physical and mental, and this view may present an advance from substance dualism (Strawson suggests that the concept of mind should depend on a material base), it is not clear how the M and P predicates interact. Moreover, he seems to suggest that both are independent: “During a lifetime of a human being, two of these things, one of each kind, are peculiarly intimately related; but the intimacy of their union does not count against or diminish the essential independence of their nature” (Strawson, 1966/1981, p.58), thus can be argued that both predicates have a different ontology; in other words if P-properties are non-physical properties of physical subjects what explains their existence and exactly how do they interact with the