Free Will And The Concept Of A Person

Free Will and the Concept of a Person

The subject of free will being an actual choice, or being pre-destined has thoroughly been reflected in the minds of philosophers, especially for the purpose of people’s logic. I will argue that both David Hume’s and Harry Frankfurt’s articles on the discussion of free will are cogent, because of compatibilism, in which a human has the ability to have correlation between free will and determinism, as well as, Hume would agree Frankfurt’s concept of second-order violations.

In David Hume’s article, Of Liberty and Necessity he describes, “Not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is a regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind” (Perry, Fischer, Bratman 410). Hume advocates that the causes and effects of nature correspond with the philosophical perception of free will. Likewise, he explains, “The constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have a place in voluntary actions” (Perry, Fischer, Bratman 412). By constant conjunctions, Hume refers to two objects and the relation between them, while inference is the understanding of one object to another, both concepts are necessary in actions of human nature.

Particularly, Hume’s entire article is solely based on liberty, which is referring to free will, as well as, necessity which supports the belief of determinism. Hume deliberately states his anti-libertarian argument, due to the fact that libertarians hold the belief that determinism is false. Initially, Hume defines liberty as, ...

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...hat the only way a second-order violation can occur, is through free and responsible action caused by the agent himself, which is also an object Hume would consider. Lastly, Frankfurt states, “When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his first-order desires, this commitment ‘resounds’ throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders” (Perry, Fischer, Bratman 446). Hume would respond to this in a positive way, on behalf of the belief of each individual having a decision they are free to make on their own actions in both first-order desires, as well as, second-order violations.

Overall, Hume’s and Frankfurt’s visions on compatibilism as a whole, are both legitimate through the explanation that there is no incompatibility between free will and determinism and that there is diversity in the world specifically, because of the act of free will.