U.S. doctrine focuses its COIN methods on the ability to assist a host nation in building political legitimacy and creditability. Establishing political legitimacy is the foundation of COIN strategy enabling governments to create rapport with local leaders and gain the support of its communities while simultaneously eliminating an insurgency. Doctrine is subjective rather than prescriptive; however, failure to adhere to fundamental principles causes a good deal of contradiction on how to accomplish specific goals. Evidence provided in the COIN campaigns conducted in both Vietnam and Afghanistan showed flawed implementation of basic U.S. counterinsurgency principles. Those principles include the ability to establish a valid political strategy and security all with a host nation in the lead effort. While these two wars have many differences, they are similar in ways. Specifically, how the U.S. failed to follow basic practices of COIN, and how leveraging lessons learned are paramount to U.S. strategic initiatives.
Political Strategy
A premise of COIN doctrine calls for a long-term political strategy implementing legitimacy in government instilling effectiveness in the eyes of the governed. How can one build a successful COIN campaign by supporting weak surrogate leadership as the U.S. did in both Vietnam and Afghanistan? Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam and Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan are both examples of failed leadership supported by the U.S. in its attempt to influence political reform. The U.S. based its support of Diem on the foundations of his religious background, anti-communist stance, and most importantly, his relationship with U.S. officials. U.S. officials also favored Karzai who had a shared interest in the extradition of the insurgent Taliban regime.
Unfortunately, these leaders showed hesitation to reform into the democratic institution that Western
The United States has again stumbled into an overseas quagmire from which there is no easy exit. History seems to be repeating itself when again, we are led by a group of men who launch wars without exit strategies and fail to understand the nature of their enemy. In Vietnam the United States became involved because they felt the need to stop the spread of communism throughout the rest of Asia and attempt to prevent the "domino effect." The belief is that if Vietnam fell, so then would Cambodia, Laos, etc. Vietnam was the longest U.S. war with its never ending deaths, escalating destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, and growing danger of splitting the American people (Carter 28). In Vietnam the Americans were told that U.S. was there because the South Vietnamese asked us to save them from the communist threat. But what the soldiers experienced did not add up to what the American people were being told (Thura 9). Americans have been told that the United States is going to war against Iraq in order to remove Saddam Hussein, eliminate him from power, abolish Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and prevent Baghdad from aiding terrorist groups. (Anderson 5). In Iraq the soldiers are anxious with no evidence of weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein no longer in power the reason why U.S. is still fighting in Iraq when the war was declared over a year ago is questionable (Moore 19).
Kelly, D. M. (2011). The Kunar Adt and the Afghan Coin Fight. Bloomington: AuthorHouse. Retrieved November 05, 2010, from books.google.co.ke/books?isbn=1456753045
Therefore, while there is a disagreement over whether or not there is a new American way of war, the argument, in its entirety is not built on solid ground. The United States does not now, nor has it in the past, wage war with a specific method of combat. Additionally, those who persist in making the claim despite that fact both misrepresent the way that recent conflicts were fought and how the political object of a war effects how wars are fought. Thus, there is not a new American way of war, but rather a new, and perhaps ephemeral political object present in recent wars. It is a profound mistake to pigeonhole American policy and military tactics. Such an attempt fails to consider the different circumstances surrounding each individual war—and thus the necessity to adopt different means within each of them.
Indeed, as prior U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote when describing the war on terror, “this will be a war like none other our nation has faced.” However, these changes bring the morality of this new face of war into question, and the justification of drone use and other modern military tactics involved in the war on terror is a subject of much debate. Focusing on U.S. involvement in Yemen from 2010-2015 as part of the war on terror, this essay will argue that, while the U.S. has met most of the criteria of jus ad bellum, the methods the U.S. has employed to counter terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have ultimately violated the principles of just war theory, even when analyzed from the perspective of modern warfare within the framework of the current global
Current doctrine and existing SOF teachings provide a useful framework to evaluate Operation Gothic Serpent. When evaluated against current doctrine, Operation Gothic Serpent was an inappropriate integration of SOF which resulted in a strategic failure. This paper will provide a brief summary of Operation Gothic Serpent to provide context for analysis and examine why this case fits the parameters of a special operation. It will then analyze the strategic impact of the operation. Within the context of strategic impact, it will show how SOF were inappropriately integrated into the overall mission, leading – despite an overwhelming tactical military victory – to the failure of Operation Gothic Serpent to achieve its strategic political objectives.
The Bush Doctrine introduced after the 9/11 terrorist attacks addressed foreign policies that quickly became known as a doctrine focusing on terrorism. The positive side of this doctrine was the focus on combating global terrorism. It includes the ability to defend against terrorism and those countries which support groups to commit terrorist activities. Furthermore, it should be understood that a piece of the doctrine also attempted to instill democracy by making the world a safer place (Nacos, 2012). American’s were relying on the confidence and commitment of the government to prevent future attack and to maintain a safer nation. This part of the Bush doctrine is reassuring that the United States is focused on the safety and security of the American people, and as a nation the attention to fight terrorism was foremost.
American policy was conflicted on multiple fronts. There was a high-perceived threat, but the means devised to cope with it fell short o...
Afghanistan, home to a population of roughly 30 million, has undergone some very harsh conditions. In a place that has witnessed horrific incidents due to Taliban invasions, constant warfare, and violence, Afghanistan may seem hopeless. People, particularly women and children, have been deprived of an education, and basic rights. As a result, there was a great plunge in the economy. Now, Afghanistan continues to struggle with the ruins of its land. Countries have teamed together and started to deliver aid in hopes to restore Afghanistan. The U.S. alone has sent over an estimated $100 billion in aid since 2002 (Seigel 1). However the essential question is: Is it worth it? Is it worth sending billions of dollars to a government that does not know how one-third of humanitarian aid has been spent since 2001 (Waldman 5)? Is it worth sending money when it has been confirmed that $1 billion of the $8 billion donated in the past year has been lost to corruption (Labelle 1)? Because of corruption, the United States should lower the amount of aid donated to Afghanistan and prevent waste and abuse. However, there is a possible downside to lowering aid distribution. On the contrary, if the U.S. reduces aid drastically decreases, Afghanistan may become dependent on the Taliban once again. Initially, the Taliban rose to power because they used the vulnerability of Afghanistan to their advantage after Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union. Afghanistan could go through a relapse and another Taliban Era if aid is no longer given. If the Taliban take control of Afghanistan again, which is very likely since the government already has Taliban officials, Afghanistan will suffer greatly and surrounding ...
The American dream is based on one thing, happiness, but what is happiness? Happiness is usually characterized as, something that makes you feel, fulfillment, joy, and pleasure. However I think happiness is different for everyone, and ever changing depending on where you are in life, and my life is a perfect example of this. A years ago if you asked me what happiness was, I would have told you, I was experiencing pure happiness. I had a job that paid well, a nice car, my first street bike, and an amazing girlfriend of three years and was a pretty good Christian. One day she left, and my happiness fell apart, I went into depression, and stopped caring about life and God. I turned to drugs like weed to make me happy instead of working on my self. I still struggle with depression some days, but I try to focus on my new goals in life. Graduating college with my Bachelors in Nursing, becoming closer to God once again, getting back in shape, meeting a girl in college, and getting married. For Augustine Pure happiness is only possible by living in God. In Augustine’s mind God is the greatest happiness man can obtain. He says “You stir us so that praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart is unquiet until it rests in you (Augustine, 1,1).” I need to start applying Augustine’s teachings to my personal happiness. If I can focus more of myself on God and trust him, everything will work itself out in the end. Unfortunately sometimes we sin in order to achieve false happiness.
It is somehow strange for today’s reader to find out that the situation with America’s foreign affairs hasn’t changed much. As some clever people have said, “The History book on the shelf is always repeating itself.” Even after nineteen years, Americans think of themselves as citizens of the strongest nation in the world. Even after the September the 11th. Even after Iraq. And Afghanistan.
The U.S. attempted to apply conventional warfare strategy to the communist insurgency in South Vietnam. The result of this strategy was that U.S. forces were victorious in almost every military battle, but could not translate tactical achievement into operational and strategic success. However, during the course of the war, the U.S. discovered three elements of strategy that, if melded into a cohesive whole, could have achieved American objectives for a reasonable cost. First, the U.S. should have fully resourced and implemented a counterinsurgency strategy of pacification, as the primary U.S. military effort in Vietnam. Second, a robust network of South Vietnamese paramilitary forces, integrated with U.S. pacification, would have been the vital link to winning South Vietnamese popular support. Third, the synchronization of pacification with air mobility and air power operations would have effectively incorporated U.S. conventional firepower with the counterinsurgency effort. Next, the claim that U.S. military forces could not have been organized or resourced to implement an effective counterinsurgency will be refuted. Finally, a bridge forward explores whether the U.S. learned from Vietnam how to identify and fight a complex insurgency.
Thinking historically while conducting counterinsurgency in the 21st century poses questions regarding how to develop political and strategic plans. This bibliographic essay will examine the political and military aspect of fighting counterinsurgent warfare by 20th century theorists Galula’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” and Trinquier’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”. Strategy in fighting guerilla wars will be discussed by comparing conflicts in battles and ideologies from the past to current day. Moreover, ways to avoid the one size fits all war mentality when combating modern day insurgents will be recommended.
The military strategy in Afghanistan was lined out for Obama by General Stanley McChrystal. It was made intensely clear that if the plan was denied, it would be almost like declari...
When comparing and contrasting U. S. military operations and capabilities with regard to regular versus irregular warfare it is important to understand the definition of irregular and the spectrum of conflict. In recent history, the term “irregular warfare” has been used interchangeably with or alongside insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. This usage and comparison is too narrow. ...
... Bay of Pigs invasion, and Vietnam. In the beginning this policy of containment worked with great success, but as time went on America slowly lost sight of its core values. As a result of this actions were performed which caused the deaths of countless innocent civilians, “Lieutenant Calley and a weeping rifleman named Paul D. Meadle-the same soldier who had fed candy to the children before shooting them-pushed the prisoners into the ditch...people were diving on top of each other; mothers were trying to protect their children”(Zinn 469). The United States government must not allow one value to rule over foreign policy without question. Each value instead should be given equal thought when making decisions concerning foreign policy. Over the course of the Cold War America allowed its actions abroad to be solely based off the policy of containment resulting in